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1	 Interview	with	Takami	Yūichi,	17	June	2002.	Also	see	Takami	Yūichi.	Deru kui ni naru: NGO de meshi wo kū (Tokyo:	
Tsukiji	Shokan,	1998),	pp.	12–43.
2	 “Seikatsu	Teian-gata	Shimin	Undō	no	Atarashii	Nami.”	 In Asahi Journal	 (1	August	1986),	pp.	16–21.	The	 term	
“proposal-style	 citizens’	 movement”	 can	 be	 directly	 attributed	 to	 Takami	 Yūichi	 of	 the	 Japan	 Recycling	 Citizens’	
Association	(Takami	interview,	17	June	2002).
Beyond Protest:



















The	 shift	 in	 language	 and	 strategy	 poses	 some	 intriguing	 questions	 for	 the	 historian	 of	 social	










3	 My	 approach	 to	 ideology	 and	 its	 influence	 on	 social	movement	mobilization	 and	 development	 has	 been	 greatly	
enriched	by	 a	 growing	body	of	 sociological	 literature	 on	 framing	processes.	 Specifically:	David	A.	 Snow	and	Robert	
D.	Benford.	“Framing	Processes	and	Social	Movements:	An	Overview	and	Assessment.”	In	Annual Review of Sociology,	
vol.	26	(2000),	pp.	611–639;	David	A.	Snow	et	al.	“Frame	Alignment	Processes,	Micromobilization,	and	Movement	
Participation.”	In	American Sociological Review,	vol.51,	no.4	(August	1986),	pp.	464–481;	and	Ron	Eyerman	and	Andrew	




and	1980s	as	the	“citizen	movement	ice	age”	(shimin undō fuyu no jidai).
5	 The	 professionalization	 of	 Japan’s	 social	 movement	 sector	 from	 the	 1970s	 mirrors	 a	 similar	 process	 in	 the	 US	
theorized	upon	by	Zald	and	others	under	the	rubric	of	resource	mobilization.	Mayer	N.	Zald	and	John	D.	McCarthy.	
Social Movements in an Organizational Society	(New	Brunswick,	NJ:	Transaction,	1987).


















House	Foundation	(Tanpopo no Ie; support	for	the	disabled,	1973),	the	Peace	Boat	initiative	of	Tsujimoto	
Kiyomi,	the	activism	of	self-described	“citizen	scientist”	Takagi	Jinzaburō,	and	other	similar	movements,	








6	 This	data	is	drawn	from	a	list	of	1309	citizens’	movements	compiled	in	Banana	Bōto	Jikkō	Iinkai,	ed.	Inochi, shizen, 
kurashi: Banana bōto—Mōhitotsu no seikatsu o tsukuru nettowākāzu no funade	(Tokyo:	Hon	no	Ki,	1986),	pp.	162–226.
7	 Ui	Jun,	for	example,	suggests	that	pragmatism	was	a	common	feature	among	resident	protest	movements	in	the	late	
60s	and	early	70s.	Ui	Jun.	Kōgai genron: Gappon	(Tokyo:	Aki	Shobō,	1990),	p.	10.
8	 Oda	Makoto.	Nani o watashitachi wa hajimeteiru no ka	(Tokyo:	San’ichi	Shobō,	1970),	p.	88.
As	 important	 as	 the	 new	 array	 of	 issues,	 however,	 was	 the	 overtly	 pragmatic	 approach	 these	
movements	adopted	toward	internal	organization,	and	also	toward	conservative	political,	economic,	and	
legal	institutions.	Within	movements,	activists	argued	that	citizens	need	not	cling	to	amateurism,	and	
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popular	backlash	against	violent	and	 ideological	 social	movements	 in	the	 late	1960s	and	early	1970s.	
To	use	Alberto	Melucci’s	words,	 proposal	movements	 “broadcast”	 a	 new	 “message”	 to	 society,	which	
reconfigured	 the	 obligatory	 association	 of	 protest	 with	 social	 movements	 and	 the	 seemingly	 natural	
antagonism	between	capitalism	and	progressive	causes.9	The	 impact	of	 these	 two	developments—one	
strategic,	the	other	ideological—on	Japanese	democracy	and	civil	society	is	still	playing	itself	out	today.
2.  The Background to Proposal-Style Citizens’ Movements
Underlying	the	emergence	of	proposal-style	movements	were	a	cluster	of	environmental,	economic,	

















some	modification.	The	 legislation	 covered	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 pollution	 issues	 including	 roads,	 waste	
management,	pesticides,	sewage,	national	parks,	and	even	noise	levels.	




















Adapted	from	Research	Committee	on	the	Study	of	the	Japanese	National	Character.	A Study of the Japanese National 







Coupled	 with	 this	 attention	 in	 political	 and	 media	 circles,	 the	 proposal	 generation	 benefited	
greatly	 from	 less	 overt,	 though	 nonetheless	 significant,	 socio-economic	 transformations	 underway	 in	
1970s	 Japan.	 Affluence	 clearly	 facilitated	 new	 concerns	 with	 respect	 to	 health	 and	 the	 environment	








Thus,	 by	 the	 mid	 1970s,	 public	 consciousness	 vis-à-vis	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 economic	
development	was	extremely	high	as	a	result	of,	first,	protest	movements	which	exposed	rampant	pollution,	




Social Movement Legacies: The	 pragmatic	 strategy	 of	 activists	 stemmed	 in	 large	 part	 from	 their	
visceral	reaction	to	the	movements	of	the	1960s.	Activists	learned	first	hand	the	limits	of	social	activism,	
and	 by	 consequence,	 the	 kind	 of	 strategies	 likely	 to	 end	 in	 failure.	The	 radicalization	 and	 ultimate	
suppression	of	the	student	movement	was	key	because	many	in	the	proposal	generation	either	cut	their	
activist	 teeth	 during	 this	 period,	 or	 witnessed	 its	 unfolding	 in	 the	 national	media.	 Activists	 such	 as	
Fujita	Kazuyoshi	and	Fujimoto	Toshio,	who	established	Daichi	in	1974,	joined	the	ranks	of	the	student	
movement	 from	 the	 latter	half	of	 the	1960s	when	university	upheavals	 reached	 their	peak.	As	Fujita	
later	recalled,	infighting	among	student	groups	and	the	turn	in	public	opinion	against	students	after	the	
violent	clash	with	police	at	Tokyo	University	in	1969,	forced	him	to	rethink	the	very	notion	of	social	







Many	 activists	 also	 cite	 their	 visceral	 reaction	 to	 the	 postwar	 consumer	movement	 as	 a	 source	
of	motivation.	 Fujita	Kazuyoshi	 of	Daichi	 felt	 that	 the	 consumer	movement’s	 carte	 blanche	 support	















Habermas’	“inhabitant	of	the	life	world.”	Banana	Bōto	Jikkō	Iinkai,	ed.	Inochi, shizen, kurashi: Banana bōto—Mōhitotsu 
no seikatsu o tsukuru nettowākāzu no funade,	16–17;	Jürgen	Habermas.	“New	Social	Movements.”	In	Telos,	no.	49	(1981),	
pp.	33–37.	
15	 My	thanks	to	Patricia	Steinhoff	for	this	insight.
16	 For	a	historical	discussion	and	introduction	to	some	representative	mini-komi	see	Maruyama	Hisashi.	Mini-komi no 
dōjidaishi	(Tokyo:	Heibonsha,	1985).	















pacifism	 and	 opposition	 to	 the	 treaty,	many	 ultimately	 shifted	 focus	 to	 issues	 of	 democratization	 in	






upon	 an	 extant	 historical	 legacy.	Central	 in	 the	 ideology	 of	 proposal-style	 citizens’	movements	 were	


















citizen	as	both	an	“aggressor”	and	a	“victim”	within	postwar	 Japanese	 society.	Beheiren,	with	 its	 loose	
organizational	style	and	focus	on	individual	responsibility	and	action,	turned	the	critical	eye	 inwards,	







Learning from Abroad: Finally,	 the	 proposal	 generation	 also	 drew	 on	 strategies	 and	 conceptual	
developments	from	abroad,	particularly	networking	theory	imported	from	the	United	States.	Through	
such	theoretical	discovery,	activists	learned	how	their	self-styled	networking	model	could	become	a	tool	
for	 overcoming	 the	 disadvantages	 of	 smallness,	 decentralization,	 and	 institutional	 rigidity.	 Practical	








3. Case Study: The Association to Preserve the Earth
Theoretical Foundations












The	 student	 movement	 experience	 convinced	 Fujita	 that	 accusation-style	 movements	 were	
ultimately	self-destructive,	since	dogmatism	ruptured	their	sensitivity	to	daily	life.	Outright	opposition,	



































the	House	 of	Representatives.	 Instead	 of	 an	NPO	Law,	Takami	 originally	wanted	 an	NGO	Law	 (Non-Government	
Organization)	because	the	latter	would	allow	civil	society	organizations	to	purse	profits	and	“make	a	living”	(Interview,	
17	June	2002).	He	makes	a	similar	argument	in	his	book,	Deru kui ni naru: NGO de meshi o kū.	For	the	original	quote	









relied	 on	 donations	 and	 “free	 lunches”	 (gochisō),	 their	 members	 would	 not	 become	 independent.	
Activists	had	to	“aim	for	an	organization	whereby	people	can	earn	a	living	via	the	movement,	wherein	
they	can	 feed	themselves	via	 the	movement.”	This	philosophy	ultimately	 led	Fujita	and	his	associates	
to	the	idea	of	incorporating	Daichi	into	a	stock	company—a	move	which	took	it	beyond	the	limits	of	
earlier	cooperative	and	citizens’	movements.22	Takami	Yūichi	of	the	Japan	Recycling	Movement	Citizens’	
Association	 succinctly	 articulates	 the	 logic	 behind	 such	 decisions:	 “[O]ver	 the	 past	 ten	 years	 I	 have	
continuously	 restated	 the	 easily-misinterpreted	 idea	of	 ‘making	 a	 living	 through	 citizens’	movements’	
(shimin undō de meshi o kū)….I	don’t	think	the	popular	term	volunteer	(borantia)	should	be	valorized.…I	
just	want	citizens’	movements	to	give	up	the	idea	that	everyone	has	to	bring	their	own	lunch.	I	can’t	go	
along	with	 such	dogma.	Underlying	 the	 idea	of	 ‘making	a	 living	 through	citizens’	movements’	 is	our	
desire	 to	 raise	 societal	 awareness	vis-à-vis	 the	existence	of	 so-called	NPOs….To	put	 it	 rather	crudely,	
company	employees	work	for	the	organization,	NPO	activists	work	for	society.”23
But,	on	the	other	hand,	while	Fujita’s	model	of	an	SMO	called	for	self-sufficiency,	it	also	warned	
of	 the	dangers	 of	 “communalism”	 (kyōdōtaishugi).	The	ultimate	 aim	was	 to	provide	 an	 alternative	 to	
current	socio-economic	realities	so,	from	the	very	outset,	Daichi’s	 leaders	aimed	at	an	open,	network-
style	 of	movement	 in	 touch	with	wider	 society.	 If	Daichi	 created	 an	 exclusive	 commune	 of	 farmers	
and	consumers,	it	would	lose	touch	with	the	mainstream.	Fujita	wanted	to	bring	about	social	change	
through	activism	 in	 specific	 social	universes,	but	he	did	not	want	 to	 create	 social	movement	 islands.	
Harima	Yasuo	of	the	Dandelion	House	movement	for	the	disabled	echoed	a	similar	sentiment:	“[W]
e	realized	that	Japanese	organizations	have	a	tendency	to	end	up	like	Maruyama	Masao’s	‘octopus	pots,’	
so	 that	 is	why	we	 imported	 networking	 theory	 from	 the	US.”	 “Networking	 gave	 us	 an	 opportunity	
to	 relativize	ourselves	 and	keep	 things	 in	perspective.	Once	 [our	networks]	became	 internationalized,	















the	 formation	 of	 realistic	 solutions	 to	 these	 problems,	 and	 the	 degree	 to	which	 they	 could	 convince	
potential	members	that	these	solutions	were	indeed	realistic—in	other	words,	the	persuasive	power	of	
their	discourse	of	proposal.

















But	 this	 spectacular	 growth	 brought	with	 it	 a	 new	 set	 of	 challenges	 that	 forced	 Fujita	 and	 his	
associates	to	rethink	their	developmental	plans	for	Daichi.	While	the	movement	was	still	small	it	could	
rely	on	financial	support	from	Fujimoto	Toshio	and	his	celebrity	wife,	Katō	Tokiko.	But	as	operations	






27	 Robert	Pekkanen.	“Japan’s	New	Politics:	The	Case	of	the	NPO	Law.”	In	Journal of Japanese Studies,	vol.	26,	no. 1	
(2000),	p.	111.
28	 Ibid.,	p.	113.
29	 In	my	meetings	with	 Fujita	 he	 repeatedly	 expressed	 his	 desire	 to	 avoid	 any	 bureaucratic	 interference	 in	Daichi’s	
operations.	
Until	 the	 enactment	 of	 Japan’s	 Special	 Nonprofit	 Organization	 Law	 in	 1998,	 civil	 society	
organizations	 in	 Japan	 were	 stifled	 by	 “one	 of	 the	 most	 antagonistic	 regulatory	 frameworks	 among	
industrialized	democracies.”27	Specifically,	articles	 in	the	1896	Uniform	Civil	Code	made	it	extremely	
difficult	 for	 civil	 society	 organizations	 to	 gain	 legal	 status	 as	 so-called	 nonprofit	 public-interest	 legal	
persons.	In	effect,	this	meant	that	groups	either	had	to	remain	informal	(in	a	legal	sense)	or,	 in	some	










Group”	 (Kin’yō no Kai),	 ultimately	 laid	 the	 foundations	 for	Daichi’s	 organizational	 structure	 and	 the	
Association’s	 ideas	 vis-à-vis	 the	 organic	 movement	 in	 Japan.	 The	 Friday	 Group’s	 brainstorming	 on	
organizational	 form	 reveals	 how	 ideas	were	 a	 crucial	 factor	 shaping	 the	 strategy	 of	 proposal	 and	 the	
approach	of	such	movements	to	conservative	institutions.	






the	 group’s	 concept	 of	 networking	 and	 represented	 the	 kind	 of	 “communalism”	 that	 Fujita	 wanted	
to	 avoid.	 Second,	 the	 cooperative	 model	 potentially	 diverged	 from	 Daichi’s	 ideal	 of	 organizational	








30	 Fujita	interview,	3	April	2002;	Fujita	and	Komatsu,	Inochi to kurashi wo mamoru kabushiki gaisha,	pp.	104–105.
a	consumer	cooperative	made	no	sense	at	all.30





some	 important	 details	 if	we	 fail	 to	 take	 our	 analysis	 beyond	 the	 effect	 of	 such	 institutions.	 Indeed,	
institutions	can	only	partly	 tell	us	why	Daichi	 rejected	 the	cooperative	model.	Moreover,	 they	 tell	us	
almost	nothing	with	respect	to	the	specifics	of	the	company	Daichi	ultimately	created.	After	all,	how	
would	the	Association	to	Protect	the	Earth—a	group	which	claimed	to	be	an	alternative	to	the	leviathan	




to	 that	used	by	Beheiren,	Minamata	activists,	 and	other	movements	 in	 the	early	1970s,	Daichi	could	
simultaneously	avoid	creating	“oppressive	violent	capital,”	and	promote	its	basic	principles	of	individual	
participation	and	internal	democracy.	Daichi	would	use	the	single	share	model	to	propose	a	different	
































Daichi’s	 leaders	presented	 their	 ideas	 for	 the	 stock	company	to	members	 in	September	1977	 in	
a	proposal	 titled	“For	 the	Development	of	 a	New	Life	 Industry.”	Members	would	be	asked	 to	 invest	
5,000	yen	for	a	single	par-value	share	in	the	company.	Fujita	decided	on	this	amount	because,	on	the	
one	hand,	this	was	the	minimum	level	required	to	raise	the	necessary	capital,	and	on	the	other,	was	an	




For the Development of a New Life Industry
Building	 on	 the	 experience	 and	 achievements	 of	 two	 years	 of	 [Daichi]	 activism,	 we	 intend	 to	
establish	 “Daichi	 Incorporated.”	 Rather	 than	 simply	 another	 stock	 company,	 we	 want	 to	 create	 an	

















31	 Fujita	and	Komatsu,	Inochi to kurashi o mamoru kabushiki gaisha,	pp.	107–109.
32	 Katō	Tokiko’s	shares	were	later	sold	to	individual	members.























a	 constant	barrage	of	 criticism	 from	 the	 Japan	Organic	Agriculture	Association	 (JOAA)	 for	 “creating	
unnecessary	 barriers	 between	 consumers	 and	 producers,”	 and	 from	 the	 consumer	 movement	 for	 its	













to	 propose	 alternatives	 in	 the	 early	 1970s:	 proponents	 of	 recycling	 had	 to	 justify	 the	 use	 of	 second-
hand	goods	in	the	face	of	rising	affluence;	peace	activists	needed	to	convince	a	skeptical	audience	that	
grassroots	dialogue	between	nations	was	a	productive	alternative	 to	official	diplomacy;	and	advocates	
































































For	Fujita,	Hiraoka’s	 critical	 article	 in	Ushio	was	 a	 classic	 example	 of	 the	misguided	 accusatory	
logic	 of	 the	 1960s,	 and	 while	 it	 posed	 a	 serious	 threat	 to	 Daichi’s	 legitimacy,	 it	 also	 provided	 an	















Forestry,	 and	 Fisheries	 (MAFF)	 fervently	 implemented	 a	 policy	 of	 agricultural	 modernization.	This	
policy,	 according	 to	Fujita,	was	 itself	 part	 of	 the	more	 general	 postwar	project	 of	 returning	 Japan	 to	
international	society	as	a	major	industrial	nation.	Agriculture,	like	all	other	areas	of	the	economy,	was	























producers	 and	 consumers.”	 Agriculture	 did	 not	 turn	 for	 the	 worse	 of	 its	 own	 accord.	 It	 happened,	
according	 to	 Fujita,	 because	 “[w]e	 Japanese,	 as	 a	 totality,”	 demanded	 an	 “affluent	 and	 convenient	
society.”	 “Without	 a	 second	 thought	 we	 gave	 our	 children	 food	 filled	 with	 preservatives	 because	 it	
was	 ‘convenient	 and	easy.’	We	used	 synthetic	 soaps.	Without	a	hint	of	hesitation,	we	used	electricity	
produced	at	nuclear	power	 stations	as	 though	 this	was	 totally	normal.	We	seized	 the	 latest	 electronic	
and	manufactured	goods	that	appeared	[on	the	market]	one	after	another.	We	continued	to	squander	
petroleum.	If	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	trend	of	the	times,	then	we—all	of	us—joined	together	to	produce	





























Moreover,	 their	 acceptance	 of	 such	 produce	would	 be	 a	 pragmatic	 expression	 of	 the	 desire	 to	 break	
away	from	their	earlier	role	as	consumer-aggressors.	Thus,	participation	in	Daichi	was	as	much	about	




on	this	 self-reflexivity,	connecting	 it	directly	 to	real	 solutions	 in	the	real	world.	Fujita	articulated	this	
sentiment	to	members	succinctly	in	1981.
Obtaining	safe	produce	is	not	in	itself	the	objective	of	our	movement.	Rather,	the	origin	of	our	




























To	 the	 skeptical	 eye,	Daichi’s	 leaders	may	have	 “commodified”	 a	 set	of	 ideas	better	 left	outside	
















a	networking	list	to	be	published	by	Hon no Ki,	a	small	Tokyo	publishing	house.	As	Hon no Ki’s	owner,	
Shibata	Keizō,	later	recounted,	this	in	itself	was	a	revolutionary	event.	“By	1986,	most	citizen	groups	










movement	 strategy	also	underwent	 significant	change.	What	we	might	call	 the	“pragmatism	of	ends”	
came	to	dominate	the	social	movement	sector.	Citizen	activists	began	to	tap	into	and	engage	with	existing	
legal,	economic	and	political	institutions	instead	of	blindly	opposing	them.	When	possible,	they	pursued	
strategies	 to	promote	 financial	 independence	and	professionalization.	Activists	 tended	 to	avoid	broad	





broadest	 institutional	 level,	 there	 is	no	doubt	that	the	conservative	political	and	legal	environment	of	
post	Red	Purge	Japan	played	a	significant	role	in	guiding	activists	away	from	the	confrontational	model	
of	 social	 activism;	we	might	view	 the	1960s	 as	 a	 steep	 learning	curve	 in	 this	 respect.	The	experience	








constituencies,	 finances	 etc.—also	 helped	 to	 stimulate	 the	 shift	 from	 protest	 to	 proposal.	 Here	 the	
Japanese	experience	mirrored	a	 similar	process	 in	 the	 industrialized	nations	of	 the	West,	where	 social	
110
Simon	Andrew	Avenell
49	 For	 more	 on	 the	 institutional	 (political	 opportunity	 structure)	 and	 resource	 mobilization	 approaches	 to	 social	
movements	see,	respectively:	Doug	McAdam	et	al.	Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings	(Cambridge,	New	York,	Melbourne	and	Spain:	Cambridge	University	Press,	
1996);	Mayer	N.	Zald	 and	 John	D.	McCarthy.	Social Movements in an Organizational Society	 (New	Brunswick,	NJ:	
Transaction,	1987).
activism	shifted	from	protest	to	more	mainstream	strategies.49
However,	as	 I	have	argued	 throughout	 this	paper,	 the	 transformation	 in	citizen	activism	during	
the	70s	and	80s	was	not	merely	an	epiphenomenon;	nor	can	it	be	explained	entirely	in	structural	terms.	
As	the	case	of	Daichi	reveals,	activists	made	key	decisions	within	the	bounds	of	institutional	limits	and	










of	Daichi	 is	 instructive	here:	 leaders	did	not	choose	 the	 stock	company	 form	by	default.	They	chose	






can	 tentatively	 label	positive,	 and	one,	 tentatively	negative.	First,	 through	 a	 combination	of	business	
entrepreneurship	 and	 idealism	 firmly	 rooted	 in	 daily	 life,	 proposal-style	 citizens’	 movements	 helped	
reframe	citizen	activism	as	a	professional	undertaking.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	movements	of	the	1960s,	
activists	challenged	 the	entrenched	beliefs	 that	 indigence	was	proof	of	 sincerity;	 that	 legitimate	 social	
movements	should	be	funded	by	donations;	and	that	profitability	was	somehow	corrupting.	The	extreme	
version	 of	 such	 logic	 was	 that	 only	 profitable	 or	 financially	 self-sustaining	 movements	 are	 socially	
significant.	 For	 most	 activists,	 however,	 the	 primary	 implication	 was	 that	 social	 movements	 could	
legitimately	 and	 ethically	 pursue	profits	 or	 professionalism,	 if	 this	 could	 support	 their	 agenda.	From	
this	 perspective,	 proposal	movements	 represent	 a	 historical	 “missing	 link”	 between	 the	 protest-based	
residents’	and	citizens’	movements	of	the	late	60s	and	early	70s	and	the	NPO	generation	from	the	1990s.
Second,	by	adapting	 to	 the	 realities	of	 legal,	political,	 and	economic	 institutions,	proposal-style	
citizens’	 movements	 forged	 a	 less	 confrontational	 relationship	 with	 traditional	 enemies,	 particularly	


